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Abstract:
In the last decade, the People’s Republic of China has risen to prominence in the Pacific Islands 
Region as one of the largest aid donor. In the past, China’s engagement of the region was triggered 
by the principle of developing country international solidarity and Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with 
Taiwan. Presently, China is allotting aid and investing in the Pacific Islands principally to demonstrate 
the significance and importance of its role as a major Asia-Pacific and world power. Foreign aid is 
in fact an important part of the Chinese government’s ‘go global’ strategy. Notably, China’s aid is 
not conceived as a separate policy; aid ﬂows are but one element within China’s economic statecraft. 
Moreover, in the Chinese context, aid - which is normally negotiated and imparted bilaterally - tends 
to blur the traditional line between development assistance and foreign investment, and is intended as 
mutually beneficial. In the region, Chinese largesse amounts to a ‘silent revolution’, as aid recipients 
find themselves with a new source of funding and a wider set of partners. This, in turn, is changing the 
regional economic and geopolitical landscape. While Australia and the other traditional donors are 
expected to remain major players, China now offers a new port of call, and fresh economic options and 
opportunities, with the possibility of large-scale interventions. Therefore, Beijing’s aid commitment 
to the region has led to a heated debate about its effects and implications. Two issues in particular 
drive the analytical unfolding of this paper. The first issue centers on the interplay of China’s identities 
as a development partner and international stakeholder being a vector of aid provision. The second 
problem hinges on China’s role in recasting the regional aid paradigm and the discourse it spins. The 
growing aid-propped Chinese presence and inﬂuence are likely to partially erode regional support for 
the established regional partners. This has elicited a robust strain of analytically distortive narrative 
framing China as a security threat. This investigation concludes that Beijing’s aid provision will 
retain strong ‘Chinese characteristics’ due to the success of the Chinese aid model and suggests that 
traditional partners and Pacific Islands countries devise proactive and flexible strategies factoring 
China in the regional future.
Keywords: People’s Republic of China, Pacific Islands Region, foreign aid, South-South cooperation, 
traditional donors
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Introduction
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) aid to the Pacific Islands Region (PIR) has been on the 
rise since 2006. Resultantly, since then China has been increasingly recognized as an emerging 
regional aid provider. ＊1 In 2012 Beijing ranked the third largest donor to the region according 
to statistics provided by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute. ＊ 2 Currently, it might already be the 
second aid provider behind Australia.＊3 This is changing the regional economic and geopolitical 
landscape. While Australia and the other traditional donors will remain major players in the 
PIR, China now offers a new port of call, and new economic options and opportunities, with 
the possibility of large-scale interventions. In fact, the bulk of China’s aid comes in the form 
of concessional loans to fund large infrastructure projects. Unsurprisingly, the soaring volume 
and influence of Chinese foreign aid is the subject of a growing number of studies by scholars of 
diverse fields. ＊ 4
In the past, China’s engagement of the PIR was driven by the principle of developing country 
international solidarity and Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan. Today, the PRC is 
investing in the Pacific Islands to demonstrate the significance and importance of its role as a 
major global and Asia-Pacific power. China employs the narrative of international citizenship 
and participation that is characteristic of ‘donor nations’. Yet, it is surmised that China may 
be seeking to leverage on its valued economic and development relationships to challenge 
the established regional order or obtain political support for Chinese policies elsewhere. This 
is the backdrop over which the paper unfolds. This research attempts to contribute to the 
scholarly debate by examining Chinese aid dynamics in the PIR in the broad context of China’s 
ongoing integration and socialization into the international system. In particular, the analysis 
addresses the following two questions: 
1. How has the interplay of China’s identities as a development partner and the evolving 
international system shaped Beijing’s aid provision to the PIR?
2. How has Chinese aid to the Pacific Island nations recast the regional aid paradigm and 
spun narratives about China’s motives?
2. How is China’s aid given?
China’s total aid spending to the region amounts to $US1.78 billion, spread across 218 projects, 
since 2006. ＊ 5 Chinese aid is normally disbursed bilaterally, and financed through three 
instruments: ＊ 6
•  grants 
•  interest-free loans 
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•  concessional loans (fixed-rate, low-interest)
The PRC utilizes these modalities for different kinds of support and according to its assessment 
of the recipient country’s financial governance and situation. ＊ 7 Grants and zero-interest 
loans used to be the primary instruments of China’s official development aid until 1995 when 
concessional loans were introduced. ＊ 8 While China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
is responsible for grants and interest-free loans, two Chinese financial enterprises: China 
Eximbank and China Development Bank provide the bulk of Chinese overseas finance. These 
two policy banks, established in 1994, operate as part of Beijing’s portfolio of instruments to 
support China’s own development goals. ＊ 9
Grants (and Technical / humanitarian Assistance)
China’s 2014 white paper on foreign aid stipulates that grants accounted for 36.2 percent of 
the total assistance volume in the 2010-2012 interval. ＊ 10 Even though grants are commonly 
given for a value of either RMB 10 million (US$ 1.64 million) or RMB 20 million (US$ 3.28 
million) ＊ 11 they are not usually disbursed as cash, but rather are in the form of Chinese 
goods and services, and used for small and medium-size projects that improve social welfare, 
for humanitarian aid, and as other in-kind assistance. ＊ 12 China’s 2011 White Paper on Aid 
categorizes building hospitals, schools and low-cost houses, and water-supply projects as the 
fulfillment of social welfare. ＊ 13 Furthermore, other in-kind assistance consists of “providing 
expertise in the fields of education, health, agriculture, environmental conservation, military 
and processing.” ＊ 14 In addition, Beijing offers scholarships and training programs. ＊ 15 Apart 
from providing goods and services, Chinese government’s humanitarian aid for rapid response 
to emergencies or disasters is provided in ‘cash’ ＊ 16 consistently with a growing trend among 
other donors. ＊17
Interest-free loans  
Interest free loans are usually provided for a twenty-year period, including five years of use, 
five years’ grace and ten years of repayment. They are normally utilized for public facilities 
and projects that “improve people’s livelihoods.” ＊18 The repayment terms can be renegotiated, 
and outstanding debts can be cancelled (by turning them into grants). However, interest free 
loans are only provided following China’s assessment of the recipients’ financial conditions. A 
University of Stellenbosch’s study on Chinese aid to Africa notes that Beijing’s interest free 
loans are often remitted (converted into grants) for the sake of debt relief to mark visits of 
Chinese leaders or high-profile figures. ＊19 In such instances, China’s generosity is imparted to 
gain respect as a responsible international stakeholder from the recipient countries and the 
global community. ＊ 20
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Concessional loans  
Concessional (or preferential) loans are provided to fund large projects, with a minimum 
loan of RMB 20 million (US$ 3.28 million). “According to analysis by the Australian National 
University, the loans typically offer a five- to seven-year grace period and then an interest rate 
of 2 to 3 percent over 15 to 20 years,” ＊ 21 and are as much about securing market access for 
Chinese companies as helping recipient nations. These loans are provided by China Eximbank 
“under the designation of the Chinese Government.” The objective of these concessional loans is 
to “promote economic development and improve living standards in developing countries,” and 
to “boost economic cooperation between developing countries and China.” Projects must be able 
to yield “sound economic returns” or generate “social benefits.” ＊ 22 
Interestingly, one of the key principles is that “the borrowing country shall have sound 
diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government, and shall be politically stable and 
economically sound, with debt servicing capacity and reliable contract performance record.” ＊ 23 
Unlike the interest-free loans, concessional loans are not easily cancelled or rescheduled. ＊ 24 
Notably, the foreign aid role of China Eximbank has expanded considerably. For example, 
by March 2000, Eximbank had financed sixty projects in thirty-one countries with total 
concessional loan commitments of only US$ 470 million, or RMB 3.9 billion. By the end of 2009 
Eximbank had committed concessional loan financing to 325 projects, worth RMB 73.55 billion 
(more than US$ 10 billion), in seventy-six countries. ＊ 25
3. The rationale and principles of Chinese aid provision
China’s foreign aid policy is based on the Eight Principles of Economic Aid and Technical Assistance 
to other Countries and the framework of South-South Cooperation. ＊ 26 The Chinese government 
officially maintains that its foreign aid is provided with no political conditions and with 
the purpose of seeking cooperation and mutual benefit. ＊ 27 However, the reality is far more 
complex. China’s approach is pragmatic, and aid has been a useful policy instrument since 
the early days of PRC. Chinese aid is not conceived as a separate policy; aid flows are but one 
element within China’s economic statecraft, which also includes official loans at commercial 
rates, export credits and suppliers’ credits. On the one hand, Chinese foreign aid has (non-
political) conditions attached, reflecting the links between aid, investment and development. ＊ 28 
On the other hand, it could be argued that most of the foreign aid provided by China is either 
tied, conditional or both. ＊ 29
For example, the contractor for Eximbank’s concessional loans must be a Chinese company and 
(in principle) at least 50 percent of materials must be procured from China. Similar conditions 
apply to projects funded through grants or interest-free loans. On these grounds, Chinese aid 
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is heavily criticized by other donors (and recipients) for being ‘tied’. ＊ 30 According to OECD 
DAC guidelines, “tied aid is official or officially supported loans, credits or associated financing 
packages where procurement of the goods or services involved is limited to the donor country 
or to a group of countries which does not include substantially all developing countries.” ＊ 31 
However, in the Chinese context, ‘aid’ tends to blur the traditional line between development 
assistance and foreign investment. 
Chinese aid does focus on economic development, but is also designed as mutually beneficial. 
It thus comes with tangible benefits for the Chinese. On the other hand, unlike OECD 
development assistance, aid from the PRC is not implicitly tied to the imposition of ‘economic 
reforms’ or increasingly political and focused on military assistance. ＊ 32 Actually, the ‘tied’ 
nature of Chinese aid derives from the idea that aid should be ‘win-win’, with Chinese 
companies, suppliers, and workers also benefiting from the provision of assistance. ＊ 33 Foreign 
aid is an important part of the Chinese government’s ‘go global’ strategy, providing support 
to Chinese companies to gain overseas experience, as well as future investment and market 
access opportunities. ＊ 34 There are further domestic drivers for the tying of aid, which Alden 
and Chen summarize well: 
A strong rationale in the form of Chinese competitiveness; the oversupply of local firms  
in areas like construction; cultural cohesion; and work ethic; as well as familiarity with  
Chinese government procedures, are all features that explain the preference for use of  
Chinese firms and factors of production in the delivery of projects. ＊ 35
The PRC government is also frequently criticized for intentionally concealing the financial 
magnitude of its foreign aid as well as the modalities used by its aid agencies. Chinese officials 
often suggest that discretion is necessary for the sake of avoiding misperceptions on the 
recipient’s side. They claim that some recipient countries could wrongly feel discriminated and 
demand more aid for the following year. This perception could get worse if there is a significant 
aid gap between two neighboring countries. Also, the Chinese government reportedly wishes 
to avoid domestic criticism of providing aid to foreign countries instead of eradicating poverty 
domestically. ＊ 36 New research on Chinese debates about the purpose of aid, and how that 
purpose should be achieved, reveals that Chinese aid is not a well-nestled element of an 
overarching strategy. Rather, where foreign aid is considered relevant vis-à-vis China’s goals, 
its use is hotly contested. ＊ 37
In addition, according to the Chinese, Beijing’s reluctance to publish aid statistics  is due 
to the fact that the government lacks a centralized administrative structure to manage the 
country’s foreign aid program, making it difficult to keep data on and calculate the volume of 
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development assistance provided by various ministries and agencies engaged in aid-giving. ＊ 38 
However, Brautigam counters this discourse by arguing that aid is managed as “part of a 
tightly controlled government reporting system.” ＊ 39 Each year, MOFCOM and other ministries 
assemble the main foreign aid budgets which are collected by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. ＊ 40
For the above reasons, in recent years Chinese aid to Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean 
and Pacific Islands has raised many questions about its composition, goals and nature. China’s 
aid commitment has led to a heated debate about its efficacy and implications. The debate is 
partially motivated by the rapid growth of China’s economic presence and influence in those 
parts of the world. ＊ 41 Is the PRC a provider of economic salvation or an imperialist power 
cunningly using aid as a Trojan horse? ＊ 42 By ignoring (Western) international standards, is 
China offering aid that is equal parts “toxic” and “enormously generous?” ＊ 43 Unquestionably, 
aid is an effective policy instrument for China’s strengthening of ties with developing or least 
developed countries and essentially contributes to Beijing’s increasing economic clout in key 
regions. ＊ 44 
Also, it would be difficult to deny that, Chinese largesse amounts to a ‘silent revolution’, as 
aid recipients find themselves with a new source of funding - and a wider set of partners. ＊ 45 
Also, some Western criticisms of Chinese aid might be ‘overplayed’ and the result of a greater 
ideological battle rather than legitimate concern for aid recipients. ＊ 46 Beijing’s motives may 
not be substantially different from those shaping the allocation of Western foreign aid. But 
its approach is successfully innovative. ＊ 47 Actually, an unbiased assessment of China as an 
international aid provider might conclude that China, short of being altruistic, is a mainly 
benign actor. 
Unlike Western aid, a significant portion of which flows through multilateral institutions, 
Chinese aid is overwhelmingly agreed and implemented bilaterally. Therefore, its effects and 
epiphenomena might significantly differ intra-regionally. At country-level, the extent to which 
China’s help can be beneficial or pernicious is the result of the synergy of exogenous factors: 
the type of assistance delivered by China and its modalities, the presence of other established 
donors and the regional geopolitical ecosystem - with endogenous aspects: domestic political 
dynamics, civil society development, ethnic milieu, economic circumstances, geographic location 
and characteristics, and geopolitical alignment. ＊ 48
4. China’s aid to the Pacific Islands
 
Facilitating economic development, eliminating poverty and improving people’s livelihoods in 
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the Pacific Island nations has always topped China’s official agenda for weaving Sino-Pacific 
relations. As stated above, Chinese aid to the Pacific Island countries (PICs) - mostly extended 
in the form of concessional loans - has totaled around US$1.78 billion in the past decade. As 
revealed by new research on the Asian powerhouse’s growing footprint in the PIR. Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu were among the largest beneficiaries of Chinese largesse 
between 2006 and 2013, which was spent on one-hundred and sixty projects across the region, 
Lowy Institute for International Policy figures show. ＊ 49 The following passage of the speech 
that Dame Meg Taylor, the Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum, gave at a 2015 
conference on China in the Pacific, is very descriptive of the aid import:
In 2006 the first China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum was 
held. Since then the region has witnessed an increased ﬂow of Chinese development assistance to the 
region. At the last China-Pacific Island Countries Forum in 2013, China announced a US$1 billion 
concessional loan for infrastructure and a further US$1 billion commercial loan for infrastructure 
projects to support economic and social development. Additionally, China pledged to provide zero 
tariffs for 95 percent for our products, 2,000 scholarships over the next four years, expand the region’s 
tourism market in China, provide agricultural assistance and to render support on environment 
protection and disaster prevention and mitigation in the region. By 2013, China’s projects in the region 
amounted to US$ 5.12 billion. This has boosted construction and transport infrastructure sectors in 
Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Fiji. China’s economic impact in the region is increasingly 
significant. Its Foreign Direct Investment in the region has risen, particularly in the minerals, 
construction, retail and wholesale sectors. The single largest Chinese investment in mining in the 
region is the US$ 1.8 billion Ramu Nickel mine in Papua New Guinea. ＊ 50
Though Australia remains the largest provider of aid to the region (around US$ 6.8 billion 
between 2006 and 2013) ＊ 51 - contributing roughly four times more than China - its assistance 
to every PIC other than Papua New Guinea and Nauru has been falling considerably over 
the last three years. ＊ 52 For example, Chinese aid to Fiji in the seven years to 2013 exceeded 
Australia’s contribution by more than US$110 million. Over the same period, China has given 
the Cook Islands US$28 million more than Australia. ＊ 53 Even though the United States, Japan 
and New Zealand had outspent China in the region on total numbers up to 2013, ＊ 54 in 2015 
Lowy Institute researcher Philippa Brant announced that China was on track to become the 
third largest donor in the region. ＊ 55 One year later, Beijing appears to be rising to second place 
in terms of total aid delivered to the region since 2006. ＊ 56
Notably, China does not publish comprehensive official figures about its aid programs, but 
Brant was able to agglutinate the data from more than five-hundred sources, including 
documents available only in Chinese, interviews, site visits and Pacific nations’ budgets. ＊57 She 
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found out that: 
Australia still dominates in terms of the amount of aid, so I don’t think we’re seeing any kind of 
challenge to Australia’s role in the region, and I don’t think the Australian government should have 
any concerns […] but China is having a large impact within Pacific Island communities and that’s 
something Australia and New Zealand need to consider. ＊ 58
Indeed, China might soon become the Pacific’s second largest donor, behind Australia. ＊ 59 
As explained above, China tries to combine its actual capabilities with the island countries’ 
developmental priorities when considering cooperation in infrastructure construction. The 
Chinese government, through grant aid and concessional loans, helps Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa and 
Micronesia to build schools, roads, wharfs, bridges, aquatic plants, cement plants, international 
airports, and funds the reconstruction of the commercial center of Tonga and the upgrade of a 
water supply system in the Cook Islands. ＊ 60 Some of these projects have significantly improved 
the economic circumstances of the recipient countries and their peoples’ living standards. ＊ 61
Trade between China and the Pacific Islands continues to grow robustly, with two-way trade 
almost doubling to $7.5 billion in 2015. ＊ 62 Nearly one-hundred-and-fifty Chinese enterprises 
are now in the PICs with a total investment of nearly US$1 billion and the contracts for 
construction projects exceeding US$5 billion. Seven PICs are approved destinations for Chinese 
tourists. In 2015, approximately 140,000 Chinese tourists visited the Pacific islands. Between 
2009 and 2014, the number of Chinese visitors to PICs grew by an average of 27 percent per 
annum, and now represent 7 percent of the inbound market. ＊ 63 Every year, about a thousand 
students and civil servants from the PICs (those island states recognizing the PRC) go to study 
or receive training in the PRC via scholarships or training programs. ＊ 64
The China-funded programs include agriculture, education, management, computer science, 
communications, medicine, biology, language, architecture, mechanics, aviation, economics, 
environmental protection, marine sciences and so on. Many of the awardees from the Pacific 
Islands have attained bachelor, master or doctoral degrees and now play important roles in 
their nation building. ＊ 65 Signally, China’s President Xi Jinping has pledged to provide 2,000 
university scholarships and 5,000 training opportunities for Pacific Islanders over the 2015-
2020 lustrum. ＊ 66
Chinese development assistance in the PIR started attracting increasing attention since 
the first China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in 
2006, at which China announced RMB 3 billion (US$492 million) in concessional loans to the 
region. ＊ 67 In April 2013, the second China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development 
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and Cooperation Forum was held in Guangzhou (PRC). At that event the Chinese government 
hatted-out US$1 billion in concessional loans to the PICs having diplomatic ties with China, 
and the China Development Bank announced a special loan of US$1 billion to support PICs 
in infrastructure, clean water supply, ecological farms, renewable energy and other fields, 
focusing on helping these countries to overcome sustainable development bottlenecks. ＊ 68 In 
comparison to the 2006 Cooperation Forum, both the quality and quantity of China’s aid were 
increased. Interestingly, climate change and green technologies featured in Vice Premier Wang 
Yang’s remarks. ＊ 69 
In November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a group meeting with leaders from the 
eight Pacific island countries which have diplomatic relations with the PR in Nadi (Fiji). In his 
remarks he declared that “the relations between China and the Pacific Island countries are at 
a new historical starting point,” ＊ 70 and even mentioned China’s 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road initiative in relation to the PICs.
China put forward the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiative, and we sincerely hope to share 
development experience and outcome with each island country, sincerely welcome all the island 
countries [italics is mine] to take the train of China’s rapid development, and are willing to deepen 
cooperation with the island countries in economy, trade, agriculture, fishery, ocean, energy resources, 
infrastructure construction and other fields. China will offer zero tariff treatment for 97 percent tax 
items of exports of the least developed countries. China will continuously back key production projects 
as well as the construction of infrastructure and livelihood projects in the island countries. ＊ 71
5. China: a dual-identity aid provider 
All this predicates that China intends to maintain a long-term relationship with the region. 
Again, the PRC’s engagement with the PIR is to be understood against the backdrop of a 
rising China and its ever-intensifying interaction with the international community. China 
has indeed expanded its engagement with developing countries in Africa, Latin America, 
the Middle East and Asia through “a plethora of recent investments and trade agreements, 
construction projects, and multilateral initiatives.” ＊ 72 Apart from bilateral relations, China has 
taken initiatives to engage those regions under different multilateral frameworks. For example, 
China established the Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCACC) in 2000 as “the 
institutionalization of Sino-African relations at a time of intensified interactions and following 
a period of exponential growth in such linkages.” ＊ 73 Another example of such multilateral 
mechanisms is the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum that China initiated in 2004. ＊ 74
Yet, China declined to participate in the Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development 
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Co-operation, launched at the 2009 Pacific Islands Forum in Cairns, which is a regional 
mechanism akin to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. ＊ 75 This indicates that, in the 
PIR, China prefers to present itself as a developing country whose donor-recipient relations 
are carefully managed under the framework of South-South cooperation. Simply put, as a 
development partner rather than an established donor. Wang Yongqiu, the senior Chinese 
delegate in Cairns, consistently explained China’s reluctance to participate in the Compact in a 
media interview:   
We have different approaches and practices from Western developed countries. We feel it is unnecessary 
to accept this multilateral co-ordination mechanism, but we need time to study it. China is open and 
transparent in providing aid. ＊ 76 
China’s behavioral idiosyncrasies in the Pacific Islands can be partially explained as the 
expression of its dual identity as an aid provider. One the one hand, China’s developing country 
identity explains the PRC’s proclivity to present itself as a development partner rather than 
a donor country, irrespective of the fact that China has been providing aid for decades. Thus, 
China’s assistance to other developing countries is framed as South-South Cooperation. 
Accordingly, the then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai told journalists at the Pacific 
Islands Forum summit in Rarotonga in 2012 that:  
We are here to work with the island countries to achieve sustainable development because both China 
and the Pacific Island countries belong to the ranks of developing countries. […] our policy approach 
and our practice are very different from those of the traditional donor countries. We are ready to 
exchange views, to compare respective practice; and where possible and feasible, we’re open to work 
with them for the benefit to the recipient countries. We are here to be a good partner with the island 
countries; we are not here to compete with anybody. ＊ 77
On the other hand, the ‘responsible rising power’ identity and the international community’s 
scrutiny and expectations compel China to conform to a responsible regional stakeholder 
persona: both innovatively and peculiarly. On this regard, there are new trends in China’s 
aid-provision behavior in the PIR that warrant attention. First, China has shown a proactive 
attitude towards cooperation with traditional donors and a more governance-aware inclination 
in aid delivery. ＊ 78 In particular, there is an identifiable trend of cooperation with traditional 
regional donors, with the positive case of China’s triangular cooperation with the Cook Islands 
and New Zealand - inaugurated in 2012 - standing as proof that carrying out aid projects with 
China is possible. ＊ 79
Moreover, in 2013 Australia and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
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Development Cooperation Partnership to strengthen collaboration between the two countries in 
aid delivery in Asia-Pacific ＊ 80 This MOU stands as a milestone on aid cooperation. Under the 
rather broad terms of the MOU, Australia and China agreed to conduct trilateral cooperation 
in priority areas including health. Malaria control was later identified as a pilot target and, 
in 2015, the China-Australia-Papua New Guinea Trilateral Aid Cooperation on Malaria 
Control was started. ＊ 81 Also, in 2013 China and the US agreed on undertaking trilateral 
aid cooperation on agricultural development and food security in Timor-Leste, a country 
which is located at the edge of the PIR and has strong diplomatic and institutional links 
with it. Resultantly, a small pilot project on strengthening capacity building in Timor-Leste’s 
agricultural sector was ran from November 2013 to December 2014. ＊ 82
In addition, even though in the past China failed to adequately participate in attempts to 
coordinate development efforts in several PICs, Beijing has been showing some willingness 
to learn from established donors. For example, in 2009 seventeen mid-level officials from 
MOFCOM attended a AusAID-hosted training workshop on the Australian best-practice 
system and approach. It was subsequently agreed to make it an annual event. ＊ 83 After facing 
vocal criticism about the lack of flow-on benefits of its aid to the recipient countries’ economies, 
China appears to be gradually moving from a self-centered, interested-based aid-paradigm to 
one more which is more attentive to the needs of and inputs from the PICs. ＊ 84
For example, since 2012 the PRC has expanded its cooperation with Fiji to climate change 
alleviation, sustainable development, energy security, and marine resources conservation. ＊ 85 
Also, at the 2014 second China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation 
Forum, President Xi said China was ready to enhance communication with the island countries 
on global governance, poverty elimination, disaster reduction, food security, energy security, 
humanitarian aid and climate change to safeguard the common interests of all developing 
countries. ＊ 86 Together with China’s aforementioned participation in trilateral aid projects 
in the PIR, these declaratory and factual elements indicate that China is becoming more 
preoccupied with its regional image and also the sustainability of the projects it funds. ＊ 87 
This reflects both China’s transition to a ‘responsible rising power’ persona and Beijing’s 
reassessment of its interests vis-à-vis the norms and narratives set by the traditional donors 
and the PICs. ＊ 88
6. Limits of a Security Outlook 
A realist security-outlook analytical approach might be deemed necessary, but is not sufficient 
for the sake of investigating China’s engagement with the PICs, given that the region does not 
rank high in the Chinese security strategy vista. ＊ 89 China’s presence and activities in the PIR 
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should rather be examined in the context of the rise of China and its engagement with other 
developing countries driven by commercial and status concerns. ＊ 90 “China’s presence in the 
region is not uni-dimensional, but multi-versified and in flux. China’s view and perception of its 
place in the world arena, and its capacity to act accordingly, have changed: while the PIR might 
be still considered geopolitically marginal, as a state with global vision and ambitions, China 
needs to be a protagonist in every terraqueous quadrant.” ＊ 91
China’s liaison with the Pacific Islands should therefore be viewed through the prism of China’s 
worldwide active diplomacy towards developing regions. ＊ 92 Yet, the political and academic 
debate about China in the PIR is influenced by a robust strain of realist narrative about China 
geopolitical ambitions in and phantomatic master-plan for the broader Pacific. ＊ 93 This regime 
of representation is furthered by hard-line realist scholars. Even several US congressional 
research papers assert that China’s increasing military capabilities should become a primary 
focus of US strategic concerns. ＊ 94 This realist persuasion posits that the Sino-US power 
dynamic is moving toward a balance of hard power due to China’s military modernization and 
American responses to its traditional defensive role in East Asia, thus having a ‘spillover effect’ 
in the PIR. ＊ 95 
It is a factual reality that China is expanding its naval and maritime capabilities, and being 
rigid in territorial disputes in both South China Sea and East China Sea. But it should be 
borne in mind that, contextually, Washington has been executing its pivot toward the Asia-
Pacific strategy. ＊ 96 Anyhow, anxieties about local security ripples from China’s assertive rise 
and a Chinese challenge to Western strategic dominance in the PIR are corroborated only by 
very feeble and circumstantial evidence. ＊ 97 “China has neither the hard power nor the soft 
power to dominate the region.” ＊ 98 
It is certainly correct to point out that while “the South Pacific region is not as important to 
China as say Southeast Asia or Africa; […] its interests there have had a disproportionate effect 
on both local politics and economics.” ＊ 99 However, seeing China’s increasing influence in the 
PIR primarily in terms of threats and strategic competition would be analytically distortive. 
As remarked by Terence Wesley-Smith, “[China’s foray in the PIR] is not a military challenge, 
it’s a challenge to a sort of regime of aid and support that’s been developed over many decades, 
and it’s a regime of support which comes with an agenda.” ＊100 The China security-threat in the 
PIR narrative originates from a realist premise of balance of power seen as a zero-sum game of 
inter-states relations. As former US Ambassador to China Gary Locke remarked, this is a ‘trap 
narrative’:  
Today the US-China relationship has emerged as one of the most important bilateral relationships in 
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the world, and so our two countries are attempting to develop a new model of relations whereby we are 
both committed to avoiding the historic trap of strategic rivalry between an emerging power and an 
existing power. ＊101
Such an analytical approach centers on martial capability as the driving force of foreign policy 
while leaving other determinants like economic development and domestic politics aside. Even 
though some of China’s aid is directed towards regional defense and paramilitary forces (in Fiji, 
PNG, Tonga and Vanuatu), it is limited to benign initiatives like upgrading a military hospital 
in PNG or the provision of uniforms and cars to the Vanuatu Mobile Force. ＊ 102 Furthermore, 
China’s increased engagement with the PIR is not challenging the traditional donors’ (US, 
Australia, and New Zealand) regional development objectives given that the Pacific Islands 
continue to be highly dependent on development aid from the established donors. ＊103 As for the 
Chinese aid modality, while the PRC ‘aid vision’ is different from the Western donors’, it should 
be noted that the no strings attached and non-interference principles are consistent with 
Beijing’s past and present bilateral aid modes. ＊104
Conclusion
At the end of its navigation along the currents of China’s aid to the Pacific Islands, this paper 
can now offer an answer to the two questions propounded in its introductory section. As for the 
combined effect of China’s identities as a development partner and the evolving international 
system in informing Beijing’s aid provision to the PIR, the analysis concludes that, even 
though China is improving its aid practices, its alignment with the international norms 
remains limited due to China’s dual identity as an aid giver. Nonetheless, the PRC is becoming 
more cooperative with the traditional regional donors in terms of accommodating to their 
aid management mechanisms. Beijing is also enhancing its understanding of the recipients’ 
needs and specificities by improving aid effectiveness. This is reflective of China’s persona as 
a ‘responsible power’ mindful of the international community’s scrutiny. The PRC, however, is 
not going to transform into a West-like donor. For the resilience of China’s developing country 
identity - and the success of the Chinese aid model - postulate that Beijing’s aid provision must 
retain strong ‘Chinese characteristics’, including a certain degree of opacity. ＊105
Understanding the issue of Chinese aid changing the regional aid paradigm and spurring 
narratives about China’s motives and ambitions requires the preliminary acknowledgment 
that China - thanks to the effectiveness of its aid practices - is successfully expanding and 
deepening its relations with its Pacific Island foederati well beyond aid relations. It is forging 
a strategic partnership with them. China is in the region to stay. The extension of Chinese 
influence has occurred even as Beijing no longer competes with Taipei for the diplomatic 
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recognition of the PICs. Ironically, the shift away from ‘checkbook diplomacy’ practices has 
opened new possibilities and avenues to Chinese aid and investment which, in turn, serve the 
purpose of expanding China’s commercial, economic, and political footprint. This, with time, 
could open the door to other forms of Chinese presence and eventually pose a security threat. 
However, little evidence exists that Chinese aid and economic activities in the PIR are masks 
for a greater military presence. 
More significantly, the build-up of Chinese influence is likely to erode regional support for the 
established regional partners. This long-term erosion does have potential destabilizing effects. 
Unquestionably, the future occurrence of diplo-strategic competition in the region depends not 
only on Beijing’s conduct, but also on the other major players’ behavior. “China’s rising regional 
influence needs to be accommodated; attempts to resist and contain Chinese emergence would 
likely be unsuccessful and potentially divide countries in the region.” ＊ 106 In order to limit 
influential erosion and socialize China as a positive force for development and stability, simply 
monitoring Chinese efforts in the region would not suffice. Traditional regional powers and 
PICs should also develop proactive and flexible strategies factoring China in the Pacific Island 
system. Good strategies make good futures.
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